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ABSTRACT 
This study investigated the effects of a safe driving competition facilitated by publicly-posted 
individual feedback. The turn-signal use, safety-belt use, and complete intersection stopping of 
82 pizza deliverers were observed at two experimental and three control stores, as well as 
among the civilian population. After baseline observations, pizza deliverers received posted 
weekly individual feedback on their turn-signal use (at Store A) or complete intersection stops 
(at Store B). The deliverers' safe driving scores were posted individually on a vertical scale 
along with their names. Each week the deliverer with the highest average performance was 
rewarded with a free vehicle-maintenance coupon. Turn-signal use among drivers at Store A (n 
= 24) increased 22 percentage points from baseline to the intervention phase which was 
maintained into the withdrawal phase. Complete intersection stopping among drivers at Store B 
(n = 21) increased 17 percentage points from baseline to the intervention phase and was 
maintained into the withdrawal phase. Although the winners of the weekly competitions had the 
greatest increase in performance, non-winners also increased their instances of safe driving 
during the competition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 
 
The onset of electronic commerce, paired with an increasingly busy 
public, will create increases in the home delivery of products by an estimated 
16% annually (Niemira, 1998). Shopping on the Internet alone is a 
$5.8 billion industry and this results in many more products being delivered 
to homes. Additionally, an estimated $18 billion is spent on express 
delivery to businesses (Niemira, 1998). Similarly, the home delivery of 
food products continues to grow. For example, in 1997, one national pizza 
delivery corporation grew at a rate of 12.5% with revenues of $1.04 billion 
(Cravin, 1998). Given these data, it is expected that the number of individuals 
involved in delivering products as a full- or part-time occupation will 
continue to increase. A primary task of these employees is driving on public 
roads. As a result, vehicle crashes represent a significant health and 
productivity concern for delivery-oriented organizations, their employees, 
and host communities. 
 
Pizza delivery is a particularly hazardous occupation. These drivers 
typically are part-time male employees, aged 18-24, with limited training 
and experience. They represent the gender and age group with the greatest 
percentage of vehicle crashes (NHTSA, 1998), and they drive for their 
job when traffic is heavy or when visibility is limited (i.e., 5 p.m.-2 
a.m.). Plus, some pizza deliverers are paid on commission per pizza sold 
plus minimum wage. This translates into a contingency whereby riskier 
driving leads to more money. In fact, pizza deliverers are four times more 
likely to be involved in a vehicle crash than the rest of the population 
(Meagher, 1989). 
 
Pizza deliverers are prime candidates for behavioral intervention because 
of the extraordinary risk of this occupation. Since they are readily 
observable many times during a shift, it is possible to track certain driving 
practices of these individuals, via license plate numbers, in a time series 
fashion. It is also possible to post the results of these observations publicly 
and conduct a competition between drivers for the best driving percentages. 
This was the intervention focus of the current field study. 
 
 
APPLICATIONS OF FEEDBACK 
TO IMPROVE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 
 
Behavioral feedback strategies have been applied frequently in organizational 
settings to improve individual and group performance (see 
Alvero, Bucklin, & Austin, 2001; Balcazar, Hopkins, & Suarez, 1986; 
Geller, 1998; and Locke & Latham, 1990, for reviews). Similarly, a number 
of studies have demonstrated the benefits of using individual feedback 
to increase safety-related behavior. Vehicle crashes among police patrollers 
decreased significantly when individual behavioral feedback was 
available from in-vehicle tachograph recorders (Larson et al., 1980). Individual 
feedback techniques were also effective at increasing safe work 
practices in a coal mine (Rhoton, 1980), among nurses (Babcock, 
Sulzer-Azaroff, Sanderson, & Scibak, 1992; DeVries, Burnette, & 
Redmon, 1991), and among the staff in a group home (Alavosius & 
Sulzer-Azaroff, 1986). 
 
A recent study by Ludwig, Geller, and Clarke (2000) added individuals’ 
names and turn-signal use percentages to ongoing group feedback. A 
significant increase in turn-signal use over the group feedback phase occurred 
when the individual feedback was added to the public graph. Likewise, 
a review of 21 studies by Nordstrom, Lorenzi, and Hall (1991) 
concluded that public posting of individualized performance feedback 
was a very effective intervention technique in work settings. This included 
applications in factories (Emmert, 1978; McCuddy & Griggs, 
1984; Wikoff, Anderson, & Crowell, 1982), schools (Gross & Ekstrand, 
1983) and hospitals (Welsh, Ludwig, Radiker, & Krapfl, 1973). 
 
For maximum impact, feedback should be salient and imply a relevant 
consequence (Geller, 1996). Therefore, combining feedback with a relevant 
contingency could make it more influential (Balcazar, Hopkins, & Suarez, 
1986). One such contingency is a competition whereby participants receive 
rewards for the best behavioral performance. Kortick and O’Brien 
(1996) demonstrated that a competition between teams of package delivery 
employees (i.e., “The world series of quality control”) could be paired 
with feedback and tangible rewards to improve the quality of shipping 
performance. More specific to behavioral safety, Haynes, Pine, and Fitch 
(1982) showed that the combination of feedback, team competition, and 
rewards decreased the rate, severity and costs of accidents among urban 
transit operators. The present study investigated the impact of a competition 
between individuals in a safe-driving contest that publicly posted individual 
feedback and provided weekly rewards to the participant who 
had the best behavioral feedback. 
 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants and Settings 
Pizza deliverers at five nationally franchised restaurants (two intervention 
and three control sites) were observed departing for and arriving 
from their deliveries. Informed consent was obtained from 
participants at the two intervention sites. All vehicles used for deliveries 
were owned by the employees. At the time of this study, North Carolina 
and Virginia had laws requiring complete stops at all intersections entering 
public roads, as well as a law requiring turn-signal use for all turns on 
public roads. The law did not explicitly require turn-signal use while turning 
from parking lots onto public roads. In this situation, turn-signal use is 
considered a courtesy in the statute. Parking lots from all five stores were 
connected to roads posting a 35mph speed limit. 
 
Three stores were located in a town in the southeastern U.S. with a 
population of 35,000 and were franchises of three different national 
pizza companies that offer delivery. Stores A and B were exposed to the 
intervention, while Store C served as an in-town control. Store A’s pizza 
deliverers exited onto a four-lane road from a parking lot shared with 
one other business. Store B’s pizza deliverers exited onto a two-lane road 
from a parking lot shared with two other businesses. Most deliverers leav- 
ing Store B proceeded through an intersection with a four-way stop. Store 
C’s pizza deliverers exited onto a four-lane road from a parking lot used 
solely by the restaurant. All three stores were within one mile of a state 
university serving 13,000 students. 
 
Two additional stores were located in another town in the southeastern 
U.S. with a population of approximately 40,000. Stores D and E were 
franchised from the same national chains as Stores A and B, respectively, 
and served as same-company controls. This was done to control for any 
events (e.g., policy statements, training courses) within the company that 
could account for changes in safety practices among deliverers. Store D’s 
pizza deliverers exited onto a two-lane road and shared a parking lot with 
one other business. Store E’s pizza deliverers had their own parking lot 
and chose from two exits that led to a four-lane road. Both stores were 
within one mile of a state university serving 25,000 students. 
 
Behavioral observations of civilians (i.e., non-pizza deliverers) were 
also conducted at all five observation sites. Therefore, this study had 
non-intervention control samples (a) within the same town, (b) within the 
same company, (c) with similar road conditions (i.e., Store E similar to 
Store A, and Store D similar to Store B), and (d) of a civilian population. 
 
Drivers at Stores A and D earned minimum wage (i.e., $5.50 per hour at 
the time of the study) and received 29¢ a mile. Drivers at Store B and E 
earned minimum wage and received 6% of the sales they delivered. 
Drivers at Store C earned minimum wage plus $1 for every order they delivered. 
All deliverers earned extra money through customer tips. 
 
 
Observation Procedure 
 
Data were collected by trained observers using a behavioral checklist 
format applied extensively for this type of field research (Ludwig & 
Geller, 1991, 1997, 2000). Behavioral observations took place during 
peak business hours (i.e., lunch time, 11:30-1:30 p.m.; dinner time, 
5:00-8:00 p.m.; and evening, 9:00-11:00 p.m.) from hidden positions 
overlooking the parking area of each pizza store. Data collectors were 
trained extensively at conducting field observations, and were blind to the 
scheduling and assignment of the intervention conditions. To assess 
interobserver reliability, observations were recorded independently by 
two research assistants for approximately 30% of the observation sessions. 
 
Deliverers’ use of turn signals and safety belts were recorded using a 
simple “yes” or “no” coding. Intersection stopping was coded as a “yes” 
when the vehicle’s wheels stopped moving. Additionally, observers re- 
corded vehicle license plate numbers and noted whether the driver was departing 
for or returning from a delivery. 
 
 
Experimental Design 
 
This study used an AA’BA multiple baseline design across two stores 
with non-intervention control stores and civilians. Prior to the intervention, 
baseline observations of pizza deliverers’ complete intersection 
stops, turn-signal use, and safety-belt use were conducted for 7 consecutive 
weeks. During the last week of baseline (A’) obtrusive in-store observations 
were conducted. A competition-based intervention was then 
conducted for 5 weeks followed by a 2-week withdrawal phase. 
 
After an analysis of the baseline data, it was determined that the lowest 
and most stable behavior at Store A was turn-signal use, and the lowest 
and most stable behavior at Store B was intersection stopping. Therefore, 
turn-signal use was selected as the target behavior at Store A, and complete 
stopping became the target behavior at Store B. 
 
In-Store Observations. One week before and during the entire intervention 
phase, data were collected obtrusively inside Stores A and B. This 
helped to preserve the anonymity of the observers collecting ongoing research 
data from hidden external locations. Trained observers were stationed 
at the front window overlooking the store’s parking lot and used the 
same behavioral checksheet as the external hidden data collectors. 
In-store observers were not allowed to show employees their checksheets 
but if asked they were trained to respond “I am monitoring this store’s 
[targeted behavior].” Observers stationed inside were never scheduled to 
collect data from the external locations. The in-store observations ceased 
at the end of the intervention phase, while the unobtrusive behavior observations 
outside the store continued throughout the three phases. 
 
Intervention. The beginning and end of the intervention phase were 
staggered across the two experimental stores. The intervention was initiated 
first at Store A, and then one week later at Store B. At the beginning 
of the intervention the following information was posted in the store and 
put in each employee’s mailbox: 
 
• Weekly averages of [TARGETED BEHAVIOR] for each deliverer 
will be posted each Friday. 
• The deliverer with the highest percentage of [TARGETED 
BEHAVIOR] each week will be awarded a prize. 
• Several prizes (automotive-related items and services, such as free 
oil changes, valued between $15 and $20) are available and each 
week the winner will be awarded a prize. 
• In addition to weekly winners, there will also be a GRAND PRIZE 
WINNER at the end of the contest. The GRAND PRIZE will be 
worth approximately twice as much as the weekly prizes (automotive 
related items & services, such as wheel alignment, valued between 
$40 and $50). 
• Prizes will be distributed by your store manager. Deliverers can win 
more than one prize. Ties will be decided by random drawing. 
 
 
A feedback poster was placed in the store to display deliverers’ weekly 
occurrence percentages for the target behavior (i.e., turn-signal use at 
Store A and complete stops at Store B). Individual drivers’ names were 
posted next to each percentage point. All the deliverers’ names were listed 
vertically, corresponding to the scale for the targeted behavior on the 
y-axis of the graph (see Figure 1). 
The individual pizza deliverer who had the highest percentage for the 
week, as shown by the highest name and data point on the graph, received 
a reward certificate worth approximately $25. Individual feedback was 
posted once a week for four weeks, and one person received a reward certificate 
per week at each store. 
 
Posted next to the weekly individual feedback graph was a cumulative 
graph displaying each pizza deliverer’s overall performance of the target 
behavior over the course of the 4-week intervention. This graph added 
each weekly average for the individual pizza deliverers to their summed 
averages of the prior weeks. The deliverer at each store who had the highest 
cumulative average by the end of the 4-week intervention received a 
grand prize valued approximately $50. See Figure 2 for an example the 
cumulative competition signs. 
At the end of the 4-week intervention all intervention graphs were removed 
from Stores A and B and the in-store data collection ended. Data 
collection continued outside the store for a 4-week withdrawal phase. 
 
Rewards. Two months prior to the start of baseline observations, pizza 
deliverers (n = 14) at Stores A and B were asked what they would consider 
an appropriate reward, other than money for performing their duties well. 
During this reinforcer survey (Daniels, 1989) most deliverers stated that 
their personal vehicle experienced a significant amount of wear during the 
execution of their deliveries. Therefore, they felt the most appropriate benefit 
the organization could extend was help in maintaining and repairing their 
vehicles. Therefore, rewards were solicited from local merchants specializ- 
 
 
 
 
ing in car care. These were in the form of coupons a pizza deliverer could redeem 
at the merchant store. Examples of rewards included free oil changes, 
car washes, wiper blades, and tire rotations. The deliverer receiving the reward 
could choose from any of the goods and services available. The tire rotation 
was the most costly of the rewards and was only available as the 
grand prize. 
 
|In return for their donation of goods and/or services valued around $25, 
the merchants were recognized on a flyer pasted on top of outgoing pizza 
boxes after the data collection for this study had ceased. The flyer stated 
that, along with the pizza deliverers at the restaurant, the listed merchants 
wanted the community to drive safely. The flyers were attached to approximately 
3,000 boxtops of delivered pizzas. 
 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Over 103 days and across five observation sites, a total of 17,369 behavioral 
observations (including turn-signal use, safety-belt use, and complete intersection 
stops) were collected during 341 observation sessions. An average 
of 51 behavioral observations were recorded per session at each site. A total 
of 82 different pizza deliverers were observed at least six times per phase 
(Store A, n = 24 deliverers, 4,202 behaviors observed; Store B, n = 21 deliverers, 
4,387 behaviors observed; Store C, n = 10 deliverers, 1,545 behaviors observed; 
Store D, n = 14 deliverers, 1,983 behaviors observed; Store E, n = 13 
deliverers, 1,493 behaviors observed). 
 
Data from pizza deliverers who were not observed at least six times 
during each of the three phases were deleted from the data analysis. 
This procedure helped assure that only deliverers who were tracked 
throughout the whole study contributed to the database and that there 
were sufficient observations to arrive at a valid estimate of performance. 
This criterion resulted in the elimination of the data from 86 deliverers. 
Also, a total of 3,757 observations of civilian driving 
behaviors were conducted across all observation sites. 
 
In-store observers were present during only 11.5% of the out-of-store 
observation sessions. Data collected during this overlap were not included 
in the primary data analysis. Instead, unless otherwise noted, the data presented 
below came only from data collected by the hidden observers outside 
the store when there were no in-store observers present. Behavioral 
means from the in-store observations are presented alongside the 
out-of-store data in Tables 1-3. 
 
 
Interobserver Reliability 
 
Interobserver reliability was assessed during 99 observation sessions 
at Stores A and B, balanced across the three phases. This represented 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29% of all sessions. Interobserver agreement percentages were calculated 
by dividing the total number of observations agreed upon by two 
independent observers for a particular data category (i.e., complete 
stops, safety-belt use, and turn-signal use) by the total number of agreements 
and disagreements, and multiplying the result by 100%. The percentages 
for days when reliability data were collected were then 
averaged to give overall interobserver reliability estimates. Overall reliability 
(or percentage agreement) was 89% for observations of complete 
stops (range: 79%-100%), 96% for safety-belt use (range: 88%-100%), 
and 88% for turn-signal use (range: 81%-100%). There were no notable 
differences in reliability results across the five experimental sites. 
 
 
Behavioral Covariation 
 
At Stores A and B, baseline correlations of deliverers’ safety-belt use, 
turn-signal use, and complete intersection stops were conducted. These 
correlations during the baseline phase were .53 (n = 43, p < .05) between 
safety-belt and turn-signal use, .44 (n = 43, p < .05) between complete intersection 
stops and turn-signal use, and .10 (n = 43, p > .10) between 
safety-belt use and complete intersection stops. Correlations between 
behaviors decreased during the intervention phase to .09 (n = 43, p > 
.10) between safety-belt and turn-signal use, .13 (n = 43, p > .10) between 
complete intersection stops and turn-signal use, and,2.19 (n = 43, p > .10) 
between safety-belt use and complete intersection stops. Correlations remained 
low during the withdrawal phase with a .18 (n = 43, p > .10) between 
safety belt and turn-signal use, .13 (n = 43, p > .10) between 
complete intersection stops and turn-signal use, and, .08 (n = 43, p > .10) 
between safety-belt use and complete intersection stops. 
 
 
Turn-Signal Use 
 
There were 6,535 observations of turn-signal use, averaging 19.2 observations 
per session (range: 8-52 observations) at each site (Store A = 
1,546 observations, Store B = 1,612 observations, Store C = 579 observations, 
Store D = 782 observations, Store E = 595 observations, Civilians = 
1,421 observations). Figure 3 depicts daily mean turn-signal use at Stores 
A and B within baseline, intervention, and withdrawal phases. Table 1 lists 
mean turn-signal use per phase for each site (including the two experimental 
stores, the three control stores, and civilian observations). Additionally, 
mean turn-signal use recorded by in-store observers during the intervention 
at the two experimental stores appear in Table 1. 
 
At Store A, where the intervention targeted turn-signal use, the target 
behavior increased from a baseline mean of 36% to an intervention mean 
of 58%. During the withdrawal phase, mean turn-signal use at Store A decreased 
slightly to a mean of 53% but remained substantially above baseline. 
Turn-signal use at Store B did not increase from baseline when its 
deliverers received the complete stopping intervention. However, there 
was a downward trend in turn-signal use during the last two weeks of the 
intervention that continued into the withdrawal phase from a mean of 29% 
during the intervention phase, to 12% during withdrawal. Turn-signal use 
did not vary as a function of the experimental phases at the same town 
control (i.e., Store C), at either of the same-corporation controls (i.e., 
Stores D and E), or in the civilian sample. Also, an examination of Figure 
3 suggests that turn-signal use at Store A did not increase above baseline 
levels with the onset of the in-store observations (depicted by an arrow) 
during the last week of the baseline phase. 
 
 
Complete Intersection Stops 
 
There were 5,625 observations of complete intersection stopping, averaging 
16.5 observations per session (range: 7-44 observations) for each 
site (Store A = 1,445 observations, Store B = 1,459 observations, Store C 
= 551 observations, Store D = 625 observations, Store E = 441 observations, 
Civilians = 1,104 observations). Figure 4 depicts daily complete intersection 
stopping at Stores A and B across baseline, intervention, and 
withdrawal phases. Additionally, Table 2 lists complete intersection stopping 
means across all phases for each store (including the two experimental 
stores, the three control stores, civilian observations, and in-store 
observations at Stores A and B). At Store B, where the intervention targeted 
complete intersection stopping, the target behavior increased from a 
mean of 14% during baseline to an intervention mean of 31%. Then during 
withdrawal, mean complete intersection stopping at Store B decreased 
to 21%. 
 
The complete intersection stopping mean in Table 2 at Store A suggests 
no spread of effect during the intervention phase, although complete stopping 
did increase prominently during the withdrawal phase. However, further 
inspection of Figure 4 reveals a trend upward during the last two 
weeks of the intervention continuing into the withdrawal phase. Intersection 
stopping was quite stable across the phases at the same town control 
(i.e., Store C), the same-corporation controls (i.e., Stores D and E), and 
among the civilian sample. Also, an examination of Figure 4 suggests that 
complete intersection stopping did not increase at Store B above baseline 
 
 
 
 
 
levels with the onset of the in-store observations (depicted by an arrow) 
during the last week of the baseline phase. 
 
 
Safety-Belt Use 
 
There were 5,209 observations of safety-belt use averaging 15.3 observations 
per session for each site (Store A = 1,213 observations, Store B = 
1,316 observations, Store C = 415 observations, Store D = 576 observations, 
Store E = 457 observations, Civilians = 1,232 observations). Table 3 
depicts safety belt use at Stores A and B as well as the three control stores 
and civilian observations across baseline, intervention, and withdrawal 
phases. At Store A, whose intervention targeted turn-signal use, 
safety-belt use increased from a baseline mean of 59% to an intervention 
mean of 73%. And, at this store mean safety-belt use during withdrawal 
increased further to 86%. No other notable changes in safety-belt use occurred 
at the other stores or among the civilian sample. 
 
 
Weekly Winners 
 
Figure 5 shows weekly behavioral means for the individuals who won a 
prize for having the highest turn-signal means at Store A for a given week. 
The individual had to be observed at least 6 times in a week to display a 
data point for that week. Participant A8-11 (participants were coded by 
store and the weeks they won) used his turn signal (depicted by filled circles) 
52% and 60% of the time during baseline. He then won the first four 
weeks of the contest with weekly means of 90%, 89.5%, 84%, and 93%. 
The last week was won by Participant A12 who had a turn-signal mean of 
70%. Participant A12 and Participant A8-11’s turn-signal means were 
close over the course of the entire contest and both decreased their 
turn-signal use during the final week of the contest and into the withdrawal 
phase. 
 
It is noteworthy that Participant A8-11’s percentage of complete stops 
(depicted by open circles in Figure 5) trended upward toward the end of 
the turn-signal intervention. Likewise, Participant A12’s percentage of 
complete stops also showed a distinctive upward trend during the turn-signal 
intervention. 
 
Figure 6 shows weekly behavioral means for individuals who won a 
prize for having the highest complete stop means at Store B for a given 
week. The individual who won the first week of the contest (week 9) is not 
shown because she was never observed during baseline and subsequently 
was not used in any data analysis. Participant B10 did not show a notable 
 
 
 
 
overall increase in his complete stops (depicted by filled circles) during 
the intervention but did increase from a mean of 14% during the first week 
of the contest (Week 9) to a winning second week mean of 43%. 
 
During weeks 10 and 11, Participant B11, increased his percentage of 
complete stops well over baseline. He won on Week 11 with a mean of 
43% complete stops. Participant B12 started the contest with a complete 
stop mean of 9% during Week 9 and continued to improve until he won 
with a mean of 84% in Week 12. Participants B10, B11, and B12 all 
showed declines in the weeks following their wins. Finally, Participant 
B13 showed a steady increase from a complete stop mean of 22% during 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Week 9, consistent with his baseline responding, to a Week 13 mean of 
71% complete stops. No weekly withdrawal observations were available 
for Participant B13. 
Participants B10 and B11 showed conspicuous decreases in their complete 
stops after winning a week of the competition. To investigate this 
further, Figure 7 and Figure 8 was prepared to show cumulative responding 
of complete stops by Participant B10 and Participant B11, respectively. 
 
Participant B10 came to a complete stop only 3 out of the next 32 
opportunities we observed after his winning week. Participant B11 did not 
come to a complete stop for the next 23 opportunities we observed after 
his winning week. 
 
 
 
Weekly Winners vs. Non-Winners 
 
The differences in targeted behaviors between the winners and the 
non-winners are presented in Figure 9. At StoreAthe two winners showed 
a dramatic increase in turn-signal use over baseline. The 22 non-winners 
at Store A also showed an increase over baseline as a result of the intervention, 
albeit not as dramatic. At Store B, both the four winners (excluding 
Participant B9) and sixteen non-winners showed an increase during 
the first three weeks of the intervention (i.e., Weeks 9-11). After this 
point, winners and non-winners gradually decreased back to baseline levels. 
There were no differences in non-targeted behaviors between the winners 
and non-winners over the course of the study. 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
At Store A, an immediate increase in turn-signal use occurred at the onset 
of the intervention. This increase in the target behavior was sustained 
over the course of the intervention and maintained after the intervention 
was withdrawn. In contrast, complete intersection stops (Store B’s intervention 
target) did not increase immediately at the beginning of Store B’s 
intervention. Instead, a prominent increase in complete intersection stops 
was not realized until after the second week of the intervention where it 
spiked at 50 percentage points above baseline levels and then returned 
back to baseline near the end of the intervention phase where it stayed during 
the withdrawal phase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Winners 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The two winners at Store A and the 4 winners at Store B (for whom data 
was presented) increased their target behavior responding substantially. 
Participants A8-11 and A12, who were competition winners, used their 
turn signals nearly twice as much as the rest of the deliverers at Store A 
during the intervention. Although the winners at Store B (i.e., Participants 
B10, B11, B12, and B13) did, on average come to a complete stop more 
than their peers, the difference was not as prominent. 
 
It is noteworthy that many different people won rewards at Store B. 
And, those winners decreased their respective behavioral percentages 
back to baseline levels after winning. In contrast, one person won all but 
one of the weeks at Store A and was challenged the entire time by only one 
other person (who eventually won one week). In every case among the 
winners, the data point following winning the reward was substantially 
lower. 
 
An examination of the cumulative responding of Participant B11 revealed 
that he did not come to a complete stop during the next 23 instances 
directly after winning a week of the competition. A similar pattern was observed 
in Participant B10. Such a finding is suggestive of a post-reinforcement 
pause (Catania, 1979), although data demonstrating 
post-reinforcement pauses typically are associated with fixed ratio schedules. 
The competition contingency in the present case approximates 
more of a variable ratio schedule. Nevertheless, the winners at Store B, 
especially Participants B10 and B11, nearly stopped their incidents of 
complete stopping at the observed intersection almost immediately after 
winning the reward coupon. Such a finding warrants additional investigation, 
including interviews with the winners to evaluate causes of such a 
pause in responding. 
 
 
Non-Winners 
 
Regarding the social validity of the incentive intervention, it is important 
to show that the individuals who did not win were not adversely affected 
by the intervention. A competition-based intervention sets up a 
contingency not unlike a variable ratio schedule of reinforcement because 
the number of correct responses required for the reward is dependent on 
the performance of one’s competitors. However, because there can only 
be one winner, many of the competitors did not have an opportunity to 
sample the contingency (Kazdin, 1994) and, therefore, most participants’ 
responding were followed by non-reinforcement. 
 
Nevertheless, those who never experienced a reward for winning a 
week of the competition still showed a substantial improvement in the targeted 
behaviors. This is possibly because even non-winners were exposed 
to the posted individual feedback. The feedback alone may have produced 
behavior change in this study because it (a) specified desired behavior (on 
the graph), (b) prompted that behavior (the graph was visible when leaving 
the store), and (c) may have served as an establishing stimulus (Michael, 
1982) for the competition contingency (assuming the participants 
had prior experience with competitions). It is also possible that the intervention 
may have influenced social comparison and managerial actions 
linked to the posted individual feedback. However, these variables were 
not measured in the present study. 
 
Cooperative versus Competitive Contingencies 
The results of this study are consistent with research by Kortick and 
O’Brien (1996) who demonstrated the positive effects of competition on 
quality and argued that this type of competition is similar to recreational 
sports whereby individuals enjoyed competing against each other. 
 
However, there are arguments against using competition as an intervention 
strategy. The majority of participants in a competition are 
non-winners and do not get an opportunity to sample the contingency. Instead, 
intervention designers must rely on the prompting nature of feedback 
charts, establishing stimuli of individuals’ past experience with 
competitions, and/or possible vicarious reinforcement to influence 
non-winner responding. In addition, Daniels (1989) argues that competition 
may also lead to undesirable behaviors such as backstabbing, sabotage, 
and withholding information (see also Tjosvold & Deemer, 1980). 
Finally, in the present study, the responding of many winners decreased 
dramatically after receiving their reward (e.g., Participants B11 and B12). 
 
Instead, interventions that facilitate cooperation between participants 
may lead to better performance than competition-based interventions. In 
this scenario a reward is contingent on group performance surpassing a 
pre-determined goal (e.g., Ludwig & Geller, 1997; Ludwig, Geller, and 
Clarke, 2000). By way of comparison, Allison, Silverstein, and Galante 
(1992) demonstrated that a cooperative condition, whereby participants 
received money based on group performance, was more effective when 
paired with feedback than a competitive condition, in which only the participants 
with the best performance received money. Likewise, Schmitt 
(1987) showed that overall response rates were lower when subjects were 
assigned a competitive contingency rather than a cooperative contingency. 
 
At first glance a cooperative-based intervention may seem like a fixed 
ratio schedule influencing performance. However, for the individual participant, 
the reward offered by the cooperative-based intervention is not 
contingent on their behavior. Participants do not have to increase responding 
in order to receive the reward, they only have to rely on the performance 
of others. Ludwig, Geller, and Clarke (2000) demonstrated that 
over half of their participants did not respond to a group-based goal when 
group feedback was presented. Such a finding has been described as “social 
loafing” in other areas of psychology (Latane´, 1981). 
 
Therefore, future research should be designed to compare more directly 
the effects of feedback paired with a competitive versus cooperative contingency 
with close attention to the collateral effects of social reinforce- 
ment and possible response generalization. Additionally, we suggest that 
individualized response patterns should continue to be examined to more 
closely understand the effects of rewards in the context of these different 
contingencies. 
 
 
 
Spread of Effect to Non-Targeted Behaviors 
 
Past studies have shown that some safe driving behaviors covary rather 
consistently (reviewed in Ludwig & Geller, 2000). During baseline a correlation 
between turn-signal and safety-belt use (previously documented 
in Ludwig & Geller, 1991), as well as between turn-signal use and complete 
stops was evident at the experimental stores. In contrast, no correlation 
existed between safety-belt use and complete stopping. These 
correlations evident during baseline were much weaker when measured 
during the intervention and withdrawal phases suggesting that this relationship 
was moderated by the intervention. 
 
Response generalization occurs when non-targeted behaviors increase 
as a result of intervening on a targeted behavior (Ludwig & Geller, 2000; 
Russo, Cataldo, & Cushing, 1981). Evidence of response generalization 
(Ludwig & Geller, 2000) was mixed in the present study. An increase in 
safety-belt use at Store A during and after the turn-signal intervention was 
evident. Additionally, an increase in complete stopping occurred toward 
the end of the turn-signal intervention at Store A concurrent with an upward 
trend in the targeted behavior. In contrast, safety-belt use did not increase 
concurrent to the complete stopping intervention at Store B. 
Turn-signal use actually decreased toward the end of Store B’s turn-signal 
intervention concurrent with a downward trend in the targeted behavior. It 
is noteworthy that these general trends at Stores A and B were observed in 
both winners and non-winners. 
 
Participants A8-11 and A12 both increased their complete stopping notably 
toward the end of Store A’s turn-signal intervention. Although the increase 
seems to happen on Participant A12’s winning week there is no such 
relationship in Participant A8-11’s non-targeted responding and winning. 
Only Participant B11’s non-targeted responding (turn-signal use) increased 
during the complete stopping intervention at Store B and this increase 
occurred most prominently during his winning week. 
Alternatively, Participant B12 and B13’s non-targeted responding trended 
downward during the complete stopping intervention at Store B, even as 
they won their week. This behavioral ecological approach (Willems, 
1974) to safety research, initially suggested by Sulzer-Azaroff (1978), 
suggests that the effectiveness of an intervention should be assessed by its 
impact on not only the targeted behaviors but also functionally related behaviors 
not targeted by the intervention. 
 
 
In-Store (Obtrusive) Observation 
 
Obtrusive, in-store observers were used in this study to provide an 
ostensive source for the feedback. If the source was not evident then participants 
may have questioned the validity of the feedback and may have 
changed behavior in unpredictable ways based on the high probability of 
hidden observers. 
 
Most studies reveal the source of feedback during the intervention. In 
these studies the data used for feedback are collected by research assistants 
(e.g., Alavosius & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1990; Austin et al., 1996), supervisors 
(e.g., Anderson, Crowell, Hantula, & Siroky, 1988; Wikoff, 
Anderson, & Crowell, 1983), or peers (e.g., DeVries, Burnette, & 
Redmon, 1991) who have been observing behavior throughout the baseline 
phase on into the intervention and beyond. In these cases the observers 
may have been visible to participants of the study yet still innocuous 
during baseline because no information was provided as to what the observers 
were doing. During the intervention these observers become an SD 
for the feedback contingency. In other words, observation occurring in 
conjunction with feedback essentially specifies what behaviors are being 
observed, when these behaviors are being recorded for the feedback (i.e., 
when the observer is present) and, therefore, when correct responding will 
be reinforced. One cannot, therefore, separate the impact of the feedback 
intervention from the impact of observation even if the observers were 
previously visible to the participants during baseline. 
 
Indeed, in the present study we cannot adequately discriminate the effects 
of the competition and feedback intervention from the probable impact 
of the in-store observer. In-store observers were introduced to the 
milieu one week before the onset of the intervention. No immediate effects 
of these observers were noted in the data. However, one week may 
not be enough time to assess the impact of overt observation and future 
studies should extend this phase of the experimental design. 
 
One advantage of the current design is that the hidden observers could 
monitor deliverers’ driving behaviors during the intervention when the SD 
of the overt observer (i.e., in-store observer) was not present. Indeed, at 
Store A there was a 20 percentage point difference in observed turn-signal 
use between the data collected by external versus internal observers (taken 
when the other observation post was not manned). No such difference was 
observed in Store B’s complete stopping. (It should be noted, however, 
that there was no reliability collected for the in-store data.) Hence, the current 
design allowed us to have a true baseline where there was no overt observation 
stimulus. The design also provided us with an independent 
sample of behavior during the intervention apart from the overt observations. 
 
Future research using feedback should employ independent samples 
of behavior that can evaluate participant behavior when the feedback observation 
SD is present versus when it is absent. Additionally, inter-observer 
agreement data should be collected on any overt observations to 
assess reliability and make it possible to make more valid comparisons between 
covert and overt observations during feedback interventions. 
Finally, the introduction of the overt observation technique should take 
place after a period of true baseline but with enough time left before the 
onset of the feedback intervention to assess the independent impact of 
overt observation. 
 
With that said, there may not be a need to separate the effects of feedback 
from the observation stimulus. In fact, a feedback intervention is 
already inclusive of an observation stimulus. They cannot be separated. 
It would be impossible to provide feedback without collecting human, 
mechanical, or archival observations on behavior first. Therefore, to investigate 
the separate impact of observation apart from the overall feedback- 
based intervention would be akin to calling the observation 
stimulus an external variable to the design, which cannot be the case when 
using feedback. Certainly, the role of overt observation within studies employing 
feedback strategies needs to be debated further among behavioral 
researchers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
A couple of limitations of this study should be addressed when conducting 
future research in this area. There was no assessment of social validity 
in this study. This was especially relevant because of the use of 
names on the feedback graphs and the competitive nature of the intervention. 
Secondly, participants could have been interviewed to better 
understand the peer and supervisor interactions that may have influenced 
the data. On site observations of these milieus and other controlling 
variables may also be worthwhile. Such data could help us 
understand why we found divergent trends in responding between the intervention 
stores. 
 
In conclusion, this study suggests that public individualized feedback 
paired with competition can be used as an effective intervention strategy 
to increase the occurrence of safe driving practices. Moreover, it’s likely 
such a strategy will benefit the behaviors of both those who win the competition 
as well as those who do not. 
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